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Pleading, for the Future: Conversations
After Iqbal*
Lee H. Rosenthal**
One of the themes at this Symposium has been the remarkable
volume and intensity of the response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.1 Some of the papers presented at this
Symposium present the view that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,2
as applied in Iqbal, drastically altered the interpretation and application of the iconic words of Rule 8(a). But that understanding is
far from monolithic, in the bench, the bar, or the academy. Some
judges, lawyers, and scholars question the extent to which the
pleading standards have changed, pointing out that Twombly and
Iqbal are but the latest in a series of cases interpreting Rule 8; reminding us that many of the basic premises of Twombly and
Iqbal—such as requiring more than a recitation of the elements of
the claim and not assuming the truth of conclusory allegations in
analyzing a motion to dismiss—have been commonly applied in
courts for years; and reminding us that Twombly denied imposing a
heightened or fact pleading standard and that Iqbal stated that it
was applying the Twombly standard.3 The common-law process
* Originally published in 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 137 (2010).
** United States District Judge, Southern District of Texas. Judge Rosenthal
served as a member, then Chair, of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Civil Rules Committee”), and is currently Chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (“Standing Committee”). Andrea Kuperman, J.D., University of Texas
School of Law, 2004, Judge Rosenthal’s Rules Law Clerk, assisted in writing these
comments. The views expressed in this article are entirely Judge Rosenthal’s.
1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
2. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Even
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, it was likely that conclusory allegations of motive, without more, would not
have been enough to survive a motion to dismiss.”); Harrison v. Downey Sav. &
Loan Assoc., F.A., No. 09-CV-1391, 2009 WL 2524526, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 14,
2009) (“Even before Twombly, it was improper for a court to assume that a plaintiff could prove facts it had not alleged, or that a defendant had violated the law in
ways that had not been alleged.”); Soukup v. Garvin, No. 09-cv-146-JL, 2009 WL
2461687, at *3 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 2009) (“[E]ven before Twombly and Iqbal, the
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has continued; a body of appellate court cases has emerged interpreting Twombly and Iqbal.4 And since Iqbal, bills have been incourt of appeals had repeatedly held that a complaint needs more than ‘bald assertions . . . [or] unsubstantiated conclusions’; nor may a plaintiff ‘rest on subjective
characterizations or conclusory descriptions of a general scenario.’”); Argeropoulos v. Exide Techs., No. 08-CV-3760(JS), 2009 WL 2132443, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Jul. 8, 2009) (“Even before Iqbal, the federal rules required a plaintiff to do more
than just plead ‘labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)); Edward A. Hartnett,
The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 474 (2010) (“[T]he plausibility standard of
Twombly can be understood as equivalent to the traditional insistence that a factual inference be reasonable.”); id. at 481 (noting that reading Twombly to empower “judges to refuse to believe factual allegations that they find implausible”
should be rejected, “not only because of its radical inconsistency with the entire
structure of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Seventh Amendment,
but also because the Twombly opinion rather frankly and properly disowns any
such approach.”); id. at 483 (“[N]o Justice interprets Twombly to empower a judge
to disregard factual allegations simply because the judge finds them implausible.”);
id. at 484 (“Courts have long held that legal conclusions need not be accepted as
true on 12(b)(6) motions, have long insisted that pleaders are not entitled to unreasonable factual inferences, and have long treated ‘legal conclusions,’ ‘unwarranted deductions,’ ‘unwarranted inferences,’ ‘unsupported conclusions,’ and
‘sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations’ as ‘more or less
synonymous’ terms.”); id. at 498 (“The need to rely on experience and common
sense in drawing inferences is hardly radical—it is a staple of inductive reasoning,
which in turn is at the heart of our system of adjudication.”); Adam N. Steinman,
The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2010) (Jan. 20, 2010
draft) (noting that “the most significant pre-Twombly authorities on federal pleading standard are still good law in the post-Iqbal era,” and that “[a]lthough
Twombly and Iqbal recognize a judge’s power to disregard ‘conclusory’ allegations
at the pleadings phase, this does not necessarily constitute a drastic shift from notice pleading.”); Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV.
1063, 1089–90, 1090 n.175, 1098 (2009) (noting that “the requirement that a plaintiff state more than mere conclusions” “was a longstanding requirement under
Rule 8 even before Twombly,” and explaining that in “overrul[ing] a heavily criticized and poorly worded formulation of the Rule 8(a) standard in Conley [v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957),] . . . the [Twombly] Court was merely enforcing the
directive in the Federal Rules and ratifying the reality within the federal courts,
which had eschewed the hyper-literal reading of the Conley language.”).
4. See, e.g., Laffey v. Plousis, 364 F. App’x 791 (3d Cir. 2010); Phillips v. Bell,
365 F. App’x 133 (10th Cir. 2010); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010);
Rhodes v. Prince, 360 F. App’x 555 (5th Cir. 2010); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009); Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo,
590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009); Waters Edge Living LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co., 355 F.
App’x 318 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186 (4th
Cir. 2009); Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009); Arar v.
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); Floyd v. City of Kenner, La., 351 F. App’x
890 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (In re
Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig.), 583 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2009); Monroe v.
City of Charlottesville, Va., 579 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2009); McTernan v. City of York,
Pa., 577 F.3d 521 (3d Cir. 2009); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009);
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola
Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962 (9th
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troduced in Congress to address the pleading standard in the
federal courts.5
This is an important—indeed, necessary—national conversation we are having. We are really continuing a very long conversation. One commentator noted that the preeminent rulemaker,
Judge Charles Clark, stated in 1947:
[O]ne of the most difficult and one of the most permanent
problems which a legal system must face is a combination of a
due regard for the claims of substantial justice with a system of
procedure rigid enough to be workable. It is easy to favor one
quality at the expense of the other, with the result that either all
system is lost, or there is so elaborate and technical a system that
the decision of cases turns almost entirely upon the working of its
rules and only occasionally and incidentally upon the merits of
the cases themselves. In view of this dilemma, pleading at best
must be and should be a compromise. It is a compromise, however, which should be continually re-examined in order that the
proper balance may not be lost.6

This national conversation is welcome in important ways. Although there have been frequent adjustments to the discovery rules
to respond to changes in the way litigation is conducted, including
changes in 1983, 1991, 2000, and 2006, the pleading rules have remained substantively unchanged since 1938. It is fitting that we reexamine whether we are achieving the proper balance. And this
conversation is even more fitting now because it comes at a time
when civil litigation has been recently and significantly changed.
Cir. 2009); Brown v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 334 F. App’x 758 (7th Cir. 2009);
Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263 (1st Cir. 2009); Atherton v. D.C. Office of
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
5. See Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009)
(“A court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule
12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the
plaintiff to relief. A court shall not dismiss a complaint under one of those subdivisions on the basis of a determination by the judge that the factual contents of the
complaint do not show the plaintiff’s claim to be plausible or are insufficient to
warrant a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”); Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009)
(“Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after the date of
enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a complaint under rule
12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards
set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41 (1957).”).
6. Hartnett, supra note 3, at 476 n.19 (quoting CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING vii–viii (2d ed. 1947)).
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There have, of course, been periods of great change in the past that
impacted civil litigation. The changes in the 1960s that created new
causes of action and changed the meaning of access to the courts
was one such period. In the last ten years, the changes in information technology have given us another period of change that has
affected almost every aspect of activity—business, government,
medicine, education, and industry, to name but a few—and has altered litigation about those activities as well as how that litigation is
conducted. The fact of this national conversation about the entry
point into litigation, the pleading standard, is a very good thing.
The passion that reflects the conversation’s importance and the recognition of the need to emerge with the right balance and the right
answers is a very good thing. The involvement of the academy,
Congress, the judiciary, and the bar—these are all good.
There are really several conversations going on at once. It is
useful to identify the different conversations and how they
interconnect.
1. The Conversation About What the Pleading Standard Should
Be
Most of the discussion has not been about changing the words
of Rule 8.7 Some of the proposals for a legislative response have
focused on going back to earlier case-law statements about the Rule
8 words as a short-term measure while the Judicial Conference
Rules Committees engage in the lengthy, multistep Rules Enabling
Act process to craft a more lasting approach.8 Some proposals for
long-term revisions through the Rules Enabling Act to Rule 8(a) or
Rule 12 have focused on explicitly requiring limited and targeted
court-supervised discovery before a court can require a response to,
or rule on, a motion to dismiss, if the case is one in which the information necessary to plead more precisely or fully is exclusively in
the defendant’s possession. This type of proposal does not change
the Rule 8 pleading standard, but could affect the procedure for
ruling on a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in some cases. Other proposals have examined adding to the list of claims subject to heightened
pleading under Rule 9. There is a wide recognition that if the
words of Rule 8 or Rule 12 are to be revised for the long run, this
requires careful and thorough study and a transparent, inclusive,
and lengthy discussion. The specific bills that have been introduced
7. The discussion has similarly avoided proposals to abolish Rule 8 or Rules
12(b)(6), 12(c), or 12(e). The need for a pleading filter, a standard that must be
met before a case can proceed, is widely recognized.
8. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074 (2006).
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recognize that the mechanism Congress itself created for the careful, transparent, and inclusive process of amending the rules is the
Rules Enabling Act process.9 The conversation about what the
pleading standard should be is a conversation about rulemaking as
well as a conversation about what the rules should say.
2. The Conversation About Rulemaking
The words of Rule 8 have not changed since 1938. That does
not mean they have not been examined by the rulemakers. The
Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference
Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure require the Advisory Committees of the Judicial Conference to “carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice
and procedure now or hereafter in use. . . .”10 As soon as Twombly
was issued, the Civil Rules Committee and the Standing Committee
began what has turned into a long-term and intensive study of
pleading. The Committees are looking very hard at whether
Twombly and Iqbal have created problems for judges, lawyers, or
litigants in the different kinds of cases that are in our federal courts.
Here is a brief description of some of what the Civil Rules Commit9. The Rules Enabling Act sets out the specific procedure for amending rules
of procedure and evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (giving the Supreme Court the
“power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence
for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals”); id. § 2073 (requiring the Judicial
Conference to prescribe procedures for consideration of proposed rules; authorizing the Judicial Conference to establish committees consisting of members of the
bench and the professional bar, and trial and appellate judges, to assist with the
rulemaking process; authorizing the Judicial Conference to establish a standing
committee to review proposals of other committees and to make recommendations
to the Judicial Conference; requiring that business meetings of the committees be
open to the public unless the committee openly finds that it is in the public interest
for the remainder of the meeting to be closed and states the reason for closing;
requiring each committee to keep minutes and make the minutes available to the
public; requiring advance notice to interested persons of any business meetings of
the committees; and requiring recommendations to be accompanied by a proposed
rule, an explanatory note, and a written report explaining the action, including any
minority or other separate views); id. § 2074(a) (requiring the Supreme Court to
transmit proposed rule amendments to Congress by May 1st of the year in which
the amendment is to become effective, and providing that the rule proposal will
take effect no earlier than December 1st of that year unless otherwise provided by
law); see also Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference
Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure, U.S. COURTS, http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/procedurejc.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Judicial Conference Procedures] (describing procedures for amending rules, and requiring: open meetings; publication and circulation of proposals to the bench, the
bar, and the public; a period of at least six months for public comment on proposals; and public hearings).
10. Judicial Conference Procedures, supra note 9, pt. 1.
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tee and the Standing Committee did and are doing to understand
the impact of these Supreme Court cases on federal civil litigation:
1. The Committees have sought out people who have extensive and varied experience with Twombly and Iqbal, from both the
academy and the bar, to share their insights. The presenters have
included academics such as Professor Stephen B. Burbank11 and
Professor Robert G. Bone,12 and practitioners such as Gregory P.
Joseph (former chair of the American Bar Association Section of
Litigation and current president of the American College of Trial
Lawyers), Douglas Richards (who litigated Twombly in the Supreme Court), and Joseph Garrison (president of the National Employment Lawyers Association). The Standing Committee and the
Civil Rules Committee continue to reach out to lawyers representing affected parties for their views on how the decisions have actually affected their cases.
2. The Civil Rules Committee had prepared for its careful review a memorandum that sets out many of the cases that examine
and discuss Twombly and Iqbal. This memo is available on the
Rules Committee’s website.13 The memo focuses on describing
what appellate courts are telling the district courts about how to
apply Twombly and Iqbal. The appellate cases exemplify the common-law process of taking the words of a Supreme Court case and
creating a body of law that fleshes out, smooths out, and gives
boundaries to their application. This case-law continues to develop,
answering questions that Twombly and Iqbal could not: How will
this articulation of the pleading rules actually be applied in different
kinds of cases? What does the context-specific term “plausibility”
mean when it is applied to different contexts? A number of appellate court cases have reversed district court dismissals and emphasized that Twombly and Iqbal are to be applied with caution and
11. Professor Burbank has been actively involved in the debate about pleadings after Twombly and Iqbal. See Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B.
Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and
Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141 (2009); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535 (2009); Has the
Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank).
12. Professor Bone has written articles discussing the impact of Twombly and
Iqbal. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal (B.U. Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 09-41, 2009), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/BoneR
090309ashcroftREV.pdf; Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009).
13. Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman to Civil Rules Committee and
Standing Rules Committee (Apr. 15, 2010), www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
andrea_Kuperman-iqbal_memo_april_2010_1.pdf.
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nuance. And the district courts continue to provide new examples
that appellate courts will use to amplify, clarify, and manage the
articulation we are here to discuss. Careful review of the case law is
vital to understanding how Twombly and Iqbal may have affected
the standard applied under Rule 8, whether problems have arisen in
applying the standard, and whether there are types of cases or litigants that are being disadvantaged or treated unfairly. This caselaw study is ongoing. Updated versions of the memo will continue
to be publicly available.
3. The Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) is conducting a detailed and thorough empirical analysis of the grants and denials of
motions to dismiss in the district courts, comparing pre-Twombly
and post-Iqbal periods, and comparing different types of cases. The
study will involve individual analysis of cases. As a result, this study
will not only be able to tell whether a case or claim or party was
dismissed but also whether the dismissal was with or without leave
to amend. The cases are from some of the busiest district courts in
circuits across the country. The data this FJC study will produce is
vital to understanding the impact of Twombly and Iqbal. The FJC
study will be publicly available. Because the FJC study will take
some time, given its thoroughness, the Standing Committee and the
Civil Rules Committee asked the Administrative Office for preliminary data comparing motions to dismiss pre-Twombly and postIqbal. That data has significant limits. It does not, for example,
distinguish between dismissals with or without prejudice. The preliminary data is just that, but the results so far are consistent with
the appellate cases insisting on a careful application of Twombly
and Iqbal. The more detailed data from the FJC will help us to
understand fully the impact of the cases.
4. The Rules Committees have not stopped with these steps.
It is also useful to try to determine whether people who would have
filed a civil case in federal court before Twombly or Iqbal are not
doing so now, and if there is a significant increase in the cost of
bringing federal court cases because of an increase in the filing of
motions to dismiss. And it is important to understand how courts
are approaching motions to dismiss in cases involving “information
asymmetry,” in which the defendant has exclusive possession of information necessary to plead more fully. The Rules Committees
asked the FJC to reach out to the bar to ask some of these questions. The FJC conducted a closed-case survey of lawyers who had
handled federal court cases that closed in the last quarter of 2008,
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asking about different aspects of the litigation.14 The response level
was very high. The FJC’s staff conducted follow-up interviews with
lawyers who responded to the surveys. “Most interviewees indicated that they had not seen any impact of [Twombly and Iqbal] in
their practice.”15 Most plaintiffs’ lawyers said they do not use barebones notice pleading in their practice and that they already satisfy
the standards set out in Twombly and Iqbal.16 “Almost all [interviewees] indicated that their practice is to plead enough facts to tell
a coherent and persuasive story.”17 The FJC also worked with the
American College of Trial Lawyers, the American Bar Association
Section of Litigation, and the National Employment Lawyers Association (“NELA”), to compile the results of surveys of the members
of each organization.18 The NELA survey included specific questions about the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on the interviewees’
practices.19 The responses from the NELA lawyers showed that of
the 67.1% who had filed an employment discrimination case in federal court after Twombly, 29.9% said there was no impact on their
cases and 70.1% said there was an effect; and of the 70.1%, 94.2%
said that the effect was to include more factual allegations in the
complaint, and 74.6% had the impression that they were responding to motions to dismiss that might not have been filed before
Twombly/Iqbal.20 The more detailed FJC study will provide more
information. Interestingly, fewer than 15% of the NELA attorneys
responding selected any one of the following options: that they
conducted more factual investigation before filing a complaint than
they would have before Twombly/Iqbal, that they screened cases
more carefully than they did before Twombly/Iqbal, or that they
raised different claims than they did before Twombly/Iqbal.21
These surveys are far from the end of the story. There needs to be
14. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. CTR., LITIGACOSTS IN CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf.
15. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUD. CTR., IN THEIR
WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL
LITIGATION 25 (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv3.pdf/$file/
costciv3.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. CTR., ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2010), http:/
/www.fjc.gov/public/ pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv2.pdf/$file/costciv2.pdf.
19. Id. at 11.
20. See id. at 11–12.
21. Id. at 12.
TION
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more investigation, and there will be. But the results are consistent
with the appellate case-law and with the preliminary data. Taken
together, they underscore the importance of understanding the effects of the Supreme Court decisions.
5. The Civil Rules Committee and the Standing Committee
were planning—even before Iqbal was decided—to step back and
take a hard look at civil litigation in the federal courts and to ask
the bench and the bar how well it is working and how it might be
improved. The Civil Rules Committee decided to conduct a major
conference and invite a broad, representative group of lawyers, litigants, law professors, and judges. Pleading was always an important aspect of this conference. Since Iqbal, its importance has
become even greater. A central part of the May 2010 Conference is
a panel on pleading moderated by Professor Arthur Miller, with
Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit (who wrote the Second
Circuit’s panel opinion in Iqbal), Professor Adam Pritchard, Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Daniel Girard (a lawyer focusing on plaintiffs’ consumer, securities, and antitrust cases), Sheila Birnbaum (a
lawyer focusing on defense of product liability cases), and Jocelyn
Larkin (a public interest lawyer).22
Because pleading is only part of the intertwined structure of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 2010 Conference is also
looking hard at discovery, including e-discovery, judicial case management, summary judgment, trials, and settlements. The Conference will rely heavily on new empirical research and data to provide
an accurate picture of what is happening in federal courts, and will
present the practical insights of the bar. The research is being conducted by such diverse groups as the FJC, American Bar Association, American College of Trial Lawyers, Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal System, RAND Corporation,
Cornell University, and others. We hope to obtain data about how
much it actually costs to respond to and engage in various litigation
tasks, especially electronic discovery. All these studies will give the
Rules Committees much-needed information on discovery costs
and burdens, in more detail than has previously been available.
That in turn will be important to inform decisions on how best to
achieve the proportionality standard that has been part of the discovery rules since 1983. It will also shed light on one of the concerns expressed in both Twombly and Iqbal, that discovery costs
are excessive and cannot effectively be controlled by judges manag22. Agenda, 2010 Litigation Review Conference, http://www.uscourts.gov/
Press_Releases/2010/AgendaFor2010CivilLitigationConference.pdf.
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ing cases. The 2010 Conference will present reactions to this data
from corporate general counsel, outside lawyers, lawyers representing the government, and lawyers representing public interest
groups. The Conference will also examine the experience from
state courts that have used different approaches ranging from fact
pleading to limits on discovery and on summary judgment motions.
The Conference will also examine proposals developed by bar associations to work toward proportional discovery in different kinds
of cases.
In short, the 2010 Conference will bring together previously
unavailable empirical data, examined by thoughtful academics,
judges, lawyers, and litigants from different perspectives and interests. The results could be quite important, ranging from shaping
the Civil Rules Committee’s agenda for some time, to providing
best practices for training judges and lawyers, to proposing larger
changes that may require legislation to implement. The Rules
Committees expect to learn a great deal.
In these different methods, the Rules Committees are gathering information in a disciplined and thorough way. The Committees are dedicated to taking a hard and transparent look at what the
information reveals. The information will be publicly available. It
will let the Rules Committees identify whether there are problems
in the pleading standard as it is now articulated. That understanding of what problems exist, and what kinds of cases they affect and
in what ways, is needed to craft the right response. If the problem
is that the courts are not providing a means for discovery before
ruling on motions to dismiss in cases of information asymmetry,
that may call for a rule approach that requires such discovery,
linked to Rule 11(b)(3). If the problem is the application of the
standard in certain kinds of cases or to certain kinds of litigants,
that may call for a rule approach that is similar to Rule 9, using
different pleading standards for certain kinds of cases. Rules are
always difficult to draft. Rules about pleading are the hardest; no
part of the rule book is as fundamental or as delicate. Information,
understanding, and wide input from a variety of the people and entities the courts serve is needed to do it right.
The conversation about the rulemaking process has been going
on for a long time; the Rules Enabling Act has been with us for 75
years. Congress and the courts are committed to its basic framework, but that requires an ongoing conversation about specific applications. We are in the midst of such a conversation now. That
conversation is very much about the Committees’ transparent, inclusive, and honest assessment of what the studies and the case law
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show. If the Rules Committees conclude that the Twombly and
Iqbal decisions are unfair or unworkable, or that there is an effect
on particular categories or types of cases or litigants, and that
changes in the rules are appropriate, they will say so. The Committees will recommend changes needed to address problems that are
found. And given the process and the careful basis that will be established for making recommendations, the Committees’ proposals
will be taken seriously by all the entities that are part of the Rules
Enabling Act process.
3. The Conversation About Judging
Some of the reaction to Twombly, and particularly to Iqbal, is
hard for me to read as a judge because it reveals a somewhat cynical
view of what judges do and how they do it. That view is that judges,
either intent on advancing a personal ideological agenda or helpless
to prevent the influence of that agenda, will use the Twombly and
Iqbal decisions to dismiss “disfavored” cases. Some of the discussion of Iqbal has focused on the use of the words “judicial experience and common sense” in describing how judges rule on motions
to dismiss as reinforcing this cynical view of judging. These are not
new words: Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, to use just
one example, states that privilege determinations “shall be governed by the principle of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience.”23 But it is interesting to reflect on whether it would
have changed the tone of some of the post-Iqbal conversations if
the words used had been the ones Justice Kennedy chose in
Boumediene v. Bush24 when he discussed the district court’s ability
to handle issues in the habeas cases brought by Guantanamo detainees. In that case, Justice Kennedy used the words “expertise”
and “competence” to describe what a district judge would rely on in
handling the habeas cases.25 These words describe how judges
work in objective, not subjective terms. These words describe the
work of professionals. They convey the kinds of constraints that
judges operate under, internal and external, in deciding cases, including motions to dismiss. These constraints are an essential part
of what conscientious judges do every day, in every court, in discharging the oaths that every one of us took. These constraints are
reflected in many of the cases in which courts are carefully and nar23. FED. R. EVID. 501.
24. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
25. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 796.
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rowly reading Twombly and Iqbal and are not applying them as any
kind of license to dismiss certain kinds of cases.
4. The Conversations Continue
What are all these conversations? They are about what the
standard for pleading should be in the future. They are about
working to ensure that the pleading balance is right and is stated so
that it can reliably and consistently be rightly applied. They are
also about pleading for a future that includes an informed, transparent, inclusive, balanced, and disinterested process for continuing to
ensure that the rules are fair and effective. That process has been
the Rules Enabling Act and it has worked well for 75 years. All
these conversations are based on, and support, the future of an independent judiciary working with the bar, the academy, and Congress to ensure that the rules that let the civil justice system work
for all it serves continue to do just that.

